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How fast do newly founded firms mature? 
Empirical analyses on job quality in start-ups∗ 
Udo Brixy1, Susanne Kohaut2 and Claus Schnabel3 
Abstract 
Using a linked employer-employee data set for Germany, this paper ana-
lyzes labour fluctuation and wage setting in a cohort of newly founded and 
other establishments from 1997 to 2001. We show empirically that start-
ups tend to have higher labour turnover rates, ceteris paribus. Moreover, 
bargaining coverage rates and wages in new firms are lower than in simi-
lar incumbent firms. Both the excess labour fluctuation and the wage dif-
ferential are shown to decline and become insignificant over time as the 
newly founded firms mature. Our results imply that it takes a new firm 
only a few years to become an incumbent firm. 
Zusammenfassung 
Unter Verwendung eines kombinierten Firmen-Beschäftigten-Datensatzes 
für Deutschland analysiert dieser Beitrag die Arbeitskräftefluktuation und 
die Lohnsetzung in einer Kohorte von neu gegründeten und anderen Be-
trieben im Zeitraum von 1997 bis 2001. Wir zeigen empirisch, dass Neu-
gründungen ceteris paribus tendenziell höhere Arbeitskräftefluktuationsra-
ten aufweisen. Überdies liegen die Tarifbindungsquoten und die Löhne in 
Neugründungen unter denen in vergleichbaren bestehenden Betrieben. Es 
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zeigt sich, dass mit der Reifung der Betriebe im Zeitablauf sowohl die 
erhöhte Arbeitskräftefluktuation als auch das Lohndifferenzial zurückgehen 
und schließlich insignifikant werden. Unsere Ergebnisse implizieren, dass 
es nur ein paar Jahre dauert, bis ein neues Unternehmen zu einem beste-
henden Unternehmen wird.  
 
Nürnberg, November 2004 
 
Keywords: Labour turnover, wages, newly founded firms, linked em-
ployer-employee data, Germany 
 
JEL-Classification: D21, J30, J63 
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1 Introduction 
Economic policy in Germany strongly stimulates the founding of new firms, 
not least because politicians hope that new firms may create the additional 
employment so much needed in Germany. In order to find out whether 
this is really the case and how successful new firms are, a growing empiri-
cal literature has studied the performance of new firms at various levels of 
aggregation. At the micro level, i.e. using data of individual firms or estab-
lishments, quite a few studies have been published in the last decade that 
analyze the success of newly founded firms over the years in terms of 
survival rates, employment growth, and other indicators of firm perform-
ance (see, e.g., Wagner 1994, Brüderl et al. 1996, Brixy and Kohaut 
1999, Almus 2002). From a macro perspective, using the concepts of job 
creation, job destruction and job turnover, a number of studies have tried 
to identify the extent to which new firms contribute to aggregate employ-
ment growth (see, e.g., Boeri and Cramer 1991, Bellmann et al. 1996, 
Gerlach and Wagner 1997, Turk 2002, Brixy and Grotz 2004).1 
Most of this research has concentrated on the number of new jobs cre-
ated, although the persistence of these jobs has also been taken in con-
sideration. This reflects the insight that what is important is not only the 
quantity but also the quality of (new) jobs. The quality of employment has 
also been stressed recently by the European Commission (2001: ch. 4) 
and is part of its employment strategy. While it may be difficult to define 
and measure the characteristics which best reflect job quality, wages and 
working conditions as well as labour fluctuation in the plant are surely 
among potential indicators. Whether these indicators differ between newly 
founded and incumbent firms has received surprisingly little attention in 
empirical research so far. It would also be interesting to know whether 
such differences – if they exist – vanish over time once the new business 
matures and how fast such a convergence takes place. In other words, we 
do not know how long it takes until a new firm becomes an incumbent 
firm. 
                                                
1 International studies at the micro level include Dunne et al. (1989) for the US and 
Storey (1994) for the UK; macro analyses are provided, inter alia, by Davis et al. 
(1996) for the US and Barnes and Haskel (2002) for the UK. 
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This paper seeks to overcome this research deficit by analyzing differences 
in wages, bargaining coverage and labour fluctuation between newly 
founded and other firms in Germany in the period 1997 to 2001. It makes 
use of a representative sample of establishments that were founded in 
1995/96 and that form part of a large-scale set of establishment data in 
Germany. This unique data set is described in section 2. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the determinants of labour fluctuation and traces the observed dif-
ferences in labour turnover of the cohort of newly founded establishments 
over time. In a similar way the wage differential of newly founded estab-
lishments is investigated in Section 4, and their bargaining coverage is 
compared to that of other plants. Section 5 provides some concluding re-
marks and suggestions for future research. 
2 The data 
The data used in this study is derived from two sources that are closely 
interrelated and together form an employer-employee data set. The em-
ployee side of the data set is the “German Employment Statistics“, which 
is sometimes also called the “German Social Insurance Statistics” (see 
Fritsch and Brixy 2004 for details). It requires all public and private em-
ployers to report certain information about every employee who is subject 
to obligatory social insurance, i.e. health and unemployment insurance 
along with pension funds. Misreporting is legally sanctioned. The informa-
tion collected is transformed into an establishment file that provides longi-
tudinal information about the establishments and their employees and 
which is called “IAB Establishment Register”.2 A great advantage of this 
database is that it covers all establishments that employ at last one em-
ployee who is liable to social insurance. The attributes of each firm cov-
ered in this database are the number of employees, their sex, age, and 
qualification (four levels) as well as the wages and salaries paid and the 
exact duration of the engagement in days. Although these data refer to 
individuals, only aggregate data at establishment level were available to 
us. 
                                                
2 IAB is an acronym for Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, which is the re-
search institute of the German Federal Employment Agency. 
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The employer side of our data set is given by the “IAB Establishment 
Panel”, a random sample of establishments from the comprehensive IAB 
Establishment Register drawn according to the principle of optimal stratifi-
cation. The stratification cells are defined by ten classes for the size of the 
establishment and by 16 economic sectors. This selection process means 
that the selection probability of an establishment increases with its size. 
Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed 
the same establishments from all branches and different size categories in 
western (eastern) Germany. In order to correct for panel mortality, exits 
and newly founded establishments, the panel is augmented regularly. The 
questionnaire covers a wide variety of questions which can be used for our 
analysis, such as information on the legal form, the profit situation and the 
location of the establishment, the state of production technology and on 
bargaining coverage. Data are collected in personal interviews with the 
owners or senior managers of the establishments by professional inter-
viewers.3 
In 1997 a representative sample of establishments that reported under a 
new firm-identification-number in the employment statistics was drawn 
and integrated into the IAB Establishment Panel. From this sample 826 
newly founded establishments can be used in our analysis, 368 of which 
can be traced every year until 2001 (although not all of these establish-
ments provide information on all variables in every year). Each of these 
newly founded establishments hired its first employee between 1 July, 
1995 and 30 June, 1996. Our sample was restricted to establishments 
that had less than 200 employees in 19974 and that were in private own-
ership of one or more founders but were not owned by other firms, so 
there are no derivative foundations. The development of these newly 
founded establishments is contrasted with 4525 incumbent establishments 
from the private sector that had already existed in 1996 and had em-
ployed at least one and less than 200 employees in 1997. Of these estab-
lishments, 3083 could be traced in every year until 2001, the last year for 
which information from the employees’ and employers’ side is available. 
                                                
3  Details regarding the IAB Establishment Panel (including information on the question-
naires and how to access the data) are given in Kölling (2000). 
4  There is only one newly founded firm that was larger, on average the start-ups had five employees. 
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In our empirical analysis we predominantly make use of the data from the 
IAB Establishment Panel. In addition, exact data on the composition of the 
workforce, the number of employees, labour fluctuation, and the amount 
of wages and salaries paid in the establishment are supplied from the 
quasi-official German Employment Statistics via the IAB Establishment 
Register. The data are linked through a plant identifier that is available in 
both data sets. 
Some descriptive evidence based on weighted data from our representa-
tive set of data is presented in Table 1 for western and eastern Germany. 
The comparison of newly founded and incumbent establishments shows 
that there were substantial (and statistically significant) differences be-
tween both groups in 1997. On average, newly founded firms were much 
smaller and had a higher share of low-skilled employees than incumbent 
firms. Their export share was slightly higher, and more of them said that 
their production technology was state of the art. New firms were also 
characterized by a higher labour fluctuation (measured by the labour turn-
over rate, the hiring rate and the departure rate explained below), by a 
lower bargaining coverage and by lower wages than incumbents. It will be 
interesting to see whether these differences still show up in multivariate 
analyses. 
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Table 1:  Newly founded and incumbent firms in Germany 1997 
(sample restricted to establishments with less than 200 employees) 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Establishment 
characteristics 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Difference 
(t-test) 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Difference 
(t-test) 
Establishment 
size (no. of 
employees) 
2.4 8.3 -5.9** 
(-278.1) 
4.2 9.6 -5.3** 
(-73.5) 
Female  
employees (%) 
40.5 47.0 -6.5** 
(-40.3) 
47.8 48.2 -0.4 
(-1.6) 
Part-time  
employees (%) 
17.5 15.5 2.0** 
(15.4) 
9.4 9.4 -0.0 
(-0.1) 
Fixed-term  
employees (%) 
1.4 1.6 -0.2** 
(-8.2) 
2.1 1.9 0.2** 
(3.3) 
High-skilled  
employees (%) 
7.3 2.1 5.2** 
(58.8) 
5.0 5.5 -0.4** 
(-4.3) 
Low-skilled  
employees (%) 
25.9 24.9 1.0** 
(6.7) 
21.9 16.3 5.7** 
(27.4) 
Export share  
(%, in 1996) 
3.3 2.5 0.9** 
(15.9) 
1.2 0.8 0.4** 
(8.8) 
State-of-the-art 
production  
technology (%) 
67 65 2.1** 
(12.4) 
70 66 3.9** 
(15.6) 
Labour 
turnover rate 
0.7 0.5 0.2** 
(70.0) 
0.7 0.4 0.3** 
(61.6) 
Hiring rate 0.6 0.4 0.2** 
(57.6) 
0.6 0.3 0.3** 
(63.0) 
Departure rate 0.8 0.5 0.2** 
(63.5) 
0.8 0.5 0.4** 
(47.6) 
Covered by  
a collective 
agreement (%) 
39 59 -20** 
(-116.3) 
31 41 -10** 
(-40.5) 
Daily wage (€) 58.4 60.1 -1.7** 
(-15.9) 
42.8 47.1 -4.3** 
(-50.2) 
NOTE:  Weighted data; two-sample t-test with unequal variances; **/* denote statistical significance  
at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
3 Labour fluctuation 
Since newly founded firms, by definition, have no current employees and 
cannot fill vacancies through vocational training or promotion in internal 
labour markets, they need to attract employees from the external labour 
market. Potential employees will compare the quality of the job offered 
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with the quality of their current job or with what they are offered by other 
firms. When assessing quality, employees can be expected to look not 
only at compensation and working conditions but also at the (expected) 
employment stability and the labour fluctuation rates in new firms. While 
some information on these issues is available from (aggregate) employ-
ment statistics, this is often not precise enough. 
It is well known that new firms are more likely to fail than incumbent 
ones, what has been termed “the liability of newness” by Stinchcombe 
(1965). The risk of failure tends to increase in the first year(s) and to de-
crease non-monotonically afterwards.5 Interestingly, at the aggregate 
level employment is usually rather stable in the sense that the number of 
employees working in a cohort of firms tends to stabilize over time at a 
level roughly comparable to the size in the year of entry since the “decline 
of employment in a cohort due to exiting firms … is more or less compen-
sated by the growth of survivors of the same cohort.” (Wagner 1994: 
144).6 This observation makes clear that behind the aggregate stability 
there is a lot of heterogeneity: While the majority of firms do not change 
employment size in their first years, some shrink, others die, and a few 
new firms show a rapid expansion and account for the lion’s share of em-
ployment growth and of total employment after ten years (see Brüderl et 
al. 1996, Almus 2002, Fritsch and Weyh 2004). 
These insights are interesting, but they do not fully reflect the labour fluc-
tuation at the plant level and individual employees’ chances of employ-
ment stability. For reasons of data availability most studies are only able 
to investigate net employment flows, that is whether the total number of 
employees in a plant has changed between two points in time. It could 
well be, however, that several hires and departures have taken place in 
this period whereas the total level of employment has remained the same. 
                                                
5  Depending on the data sets and the periods of observation used, German studies differ 
at the exact shape and length of this process; see, e.g., Brüderl et al. (1996: 94ff.), 
Gerlach and Wagner (1997), Turk (2002) and Fritsch and Weyh (2004). 
6  While this is a stylised fact for western Germany (see also Boeri and Cramer 1991, 
Brixy and Grotz 2004), in eastern Germany for a short period after unification there 
seems to have existed an exceptionally positive “start-up window” for new firms which 
resulted in substantial employment gains of several cohorts; see Brixy and Kohaut 
(1999). 
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Since our linked employer-employee data set contains information on the 
beginning and the end of each employment relationship we are able to 
analyze gross employment flows and labour fluctuation in each plant. To 
the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies seem to exist that have 
explicitly addressed these issues with German or international data on 
newly founded firms. 
For various reasons we would expect newly founded firms to record a 
higher labour fluctuation than similar incumbent firms. Since the likelihood 
of termination of an employment contract (by either party) declines with 
tenure (Franz 2003: 197), incumbent firms with a certain history of job 
matches tend to have higher employment stability than newly founded 
firms hiring their first employees. These new firms will have to go through 
the usual matching process characterized by trial and error when attempt-
ing to hire suitable employees. In addition, new firms face the problem 
that due to their higher risk of failure (and their lower wages analyzed be-
low) they may not be able to poach employees from other firms but may 
have to rely more on attracting workers who are currently unemployed. If 
unemployed people are less able (or willing) to fulfil the requirements of 
the job, there is a higher risk of layoffs or quits in new firms (followed by 
a new process of hiring). Since newly founded firms also tend to face 
higher uncertainty and fluctuation in demand for their products or services 
while at the same time having less financial resources to hoard labour in 
periods of slack, they may have to adjust employment more often than 
incumbent firms.7 Over time, these differences should become smaller and 
even vanish once the critical initial period of new employment relation-
ships is over and the economic situation of the new firms stabilizes. 
For analyzing these issues, an appropriate dependent variable and a well-
known indicator of labour fluctuation is the labour turnover rate, which is 
defined as the ratio of the sum of hires and departures in a plant over its 
average employment level in a given year. Of course, hires and depar-
                                                
7  The higher chance of failure of newly founded firms could also imply higher departures 
if firms or employees react accordingly when they see the shadow of death sneaking 
around the corner in the months or years before the exit. There is, however, conflict-
ing empirical evidence as to whether this is the case in Germany; see Wagner (1999) 
and Almus (2002). 
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tures may also be analyzed separately, relative to average employment 
levels.8 This means that we can make use of three dependent variables 
that reflect various aspects of labour fluctuation, with the labour turnover 
rate being the most encompassing one. We estimate OLS regressions for 
the period 1997 to 2001, making use of stacked cross section models for 
each year as well as pooling the data. Since labour markets and economic 
conditions still differ considerably between western and eastern Germany, 
we provide disaggregated estimates for both regions. 
The main interest of our analysis is on the labour fluctuation in newly 
founded firms, which are represented by a dummy variable indicating 
whether an establishment hired its first employee between 1 July, 1995, 
and 30 June, 1996. The other independent variables used are standard in 
labour turnover regressions of this sort.9 They include establishment size 
since for purely mechanical reasons the labour turnover rate is usually 
higher in small establishments where the entry or exit of one single em-
ployee has a higher percentage effect. In order to take account of poten-
tial non-linearities in this relationship we also include the square of estab-
lishment size. Potential spill-over effects in personnel policies from the 
mother firm are accounted for by a dummy variable indicating whether the 
establishment is a branch plant or subsidiary. We control for the structure 
of the workforce using the employment shares of female, part-time, and 
low/high-skilled employees and we take into account that establishments 
with a high proportion of fixed-term employees should have a higher la-
bour turnover. Since collective bargaining agreements are often said to 
inhibit labour force adjustments we include dummy variables on the exis-
tence of sectoral or firm-level collective agreements. Employees can be 
                                                
8  More precisely, following standard practice and in order to achieve some consistency 
with the rates of hires / employment and of departures / employment, the labour turn-
over rate was calculated as 0.5 (hires + departures) / employment (see Franz 2003: 
194). We dropped a few establishments with labour turnover rates of 3 and above 
since these may reflect some errors in the data base (the mean of this rate is about 
0.4 in our sample). Note that departures are a composite measure that includes dis-
missals, quits, and retirement, inter alia. 
9  See, for instance, Addison et al. (2001). Note that although we have a relatively rich 
data set, selection of control variables was limited by the fact that information on 
some potential explanatory variables was either never asked (this is the case for the 
capital stock and for fringe benefits) or was not available in all years of our observa-
tion period (e.g., existence of a works council and profit sharing). 
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expected not to leave establishments that pay well and are in good eco-
nomic shape. Therefore the average level of wages in the establishment, a 
dummy variable reflecting its subjective assessment of the (“very good or 
good”) profit situation and a dummy variable for its state of production 
technology are included in the analysis. The situation on the regional la-
bour market is reflected by the regional rate of unemployment; however, 
since high unemployment might be associated with less quits and hires but 
more layoffs, its total effect on labour turnover is open.10 As further con-
trols we also include ten industry dummies and three dummies for the de-
gree of urbanization at the location of the establishment. 
The results of the pooled estimations of the labour turnover rate for the 
period 1997 to 2001 (which also include dummies for each year) are pre-
sented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. It can be seen that most of the co-
efficients estimated are of the expected sign, but not all of them are sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels, and the overall explanatory 
power of the regressions is modest. While the impact of control variables 
needs not to be discussed in detail, it is important to note that newly 
founded establishments have higher labour turnover rates than incumbent 
ones. This difference shows up in western as in eastern Germany and is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, thus confirming our theoreti-
cal hypothesis above. 
                                                
10  In the estimations with Stata/SE 8.2 we made use of the cluster option to take into 
account that the unemployment data at district level are at a different level of aggre-
gation than the establishment data and that the unobserved influences on the de-
pendent variables may be not independent in establishments from the same district. 
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Table 2: Determinants of labour turnover and wages in German firms 
(OLS est.; pooled data for 1997-2001; establishments < 200 employees) 
Dependent variables Labour turnover rate ln wage 
Explanatory variables Western 
Germany 
Eastern 
Germany 
Western 
Germany 
Eastern 
Germany 
Constant 1.0356** 
 (8.44) 
1.2700** 
 (13.24) 
4.1973** 
 (123.97) 
3.9990** 
 (89.30) 
Newly founded establishment 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.0979** 
 (2.85) 
0.1468** 
 (8.87) 
-0.0901** 
 (-2.91) 
-0.0570** 
 (-3.87) 
Establishment size 
(number of employees) 
-0.0008** 
 (-5.17) 
-0.0010** 
 (-5.60) 
0.0016** 
 (10.91) 
0.0006** 
 (4.53) 
Establishment size squared 4.42e-07**
 (3.92) 
6.26e-07**
 (4.98) 
-7.30e-07** 
 (-6.14) 
-2.23e-07*
 (-2.53) 
Branch plant/subsidiary 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.0442** 
 (2.68) 
0.0265 
 (1.75) 
0.0521** 
 (3.45) 
0.0954** 
 (5.59) 
Female employees 
(percentage) 
-0.0017** 
(-5.56) 
-0.0020** 
 (-7.75) 
-0.0028** 
 (-12.31) 
-0.0037** 
 (-8.28) 
Part-time employees 
(percentage) 
0.0006 
(1.50) 
0.0007* 
(2.00) 
0.0019** 
(4.38) 
0.0037** 
(8.28) 
Fixed-term employees 
(percentage) 
0.0108** 
(7.38) 
0.0065** 
(10.90) 
0.0003 
(0.57) 
-0.0004 
(-1.47) 
High-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
0.0002 
(0.32) 
0.0001 
(0.23) 
0.0062** 
(11.82) 
0.0059** 
(17.22) 
Low-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
0.0017** 
(5.39) 
0.0009** 
(4.09) 
-0.0019** 
(-7.38) 
0.00004 
(0.27) 
Covered by sectoral collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
-0.0228 
(-1.71) 
-0.0331** 
(-2.80) 
0.0619** 
(4.33) 
0.0921** 
(9.52) 
Covered by firm-level collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.0071 
(0.27) 
-0.0100 
 (-0.71) 
0.0478** 
 (2.83) 
0.0484** 
 (4.78) 
Wage level 
(ln daily wage per employee, in €) 
-0.1545** 
(-5.90) 
-0.1988** 
(-8.43) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Firm receives wage subsidies 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-0.0114 
 (-1.02) 
-0.0534** 
 (-6.89) 
Profit situation 
(dummy: 1 = very good/good) 
-0.0119 
 (-1.02) 
-0.0350** 
 (-3.56) 
0.0395** 
 (3.73) 
0.0558** 
 (7.33) 
Export share 
(percentage) 
--- 
 
--- 0.0021** 
 (6.84) 
0.0009* 
 (2.19) 
Production technology 
(dummy: 1 = state of the art) 
-0.0232 
 (-1.86) 
-0.0592** 
 (-3.95) 
0.0577** 
 (5.90) 
0.0420** 
 (5.42) 
Legal form of the firm 
(dummy: 1 = family-owned firm) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-0.1750** 
 (-11.86) 
-0.1668** 
 (-16.32) 
Regional unemployment rate 
(at district level, in percent) 
0.0001 
 (0.06) 
-0.0005 
 (-0.23) 
-0.0007 
 (-0.36) 
-0.0051* 
 (-2.41) 
Year dummies yes* yes yes** yes** 
Industry dummies  yes**    yes** yes** yes** 
Urbanization dummies  yes** yes yes** yes** 
n 
R2 
7389 
0.1413 
9436 
0.1380 
7037 
0.4606 
9203 
0.4819 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively; see text for exact definitions of dependent variables. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 2/2005   
 
 
15
The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables for newly founded es-
tablishments can be interpreted as follows: The average labour turnover 
rate in our sample is 0.39 in western and 0.42 in eastern Germany, which 
means that labour fluctuations (i.e. hires and departures) amount to 39 
and 42 percent of the average stock of employment, respectively. In 
newly founded establishments, this rate is 9.8 percentage points higher in 
western Germany and even 14.7 percentage points higher in eastern 
Germany. In other words, over the first five years labour turnover rates in 
newly founded firms are one quarter to one-third higher than in incumbent 
firms. 
In addition to the average effects over the whole period shown in Table 2, 
Table 3 presents the results of cross section estimations for each single 
year. The models estimated are almost identical to those shown in Ta-
ble 2, the only differences being that the year dummies are not included, 
of course, and that for all years except 1999 (where information is lack-
ing) a dummy variable on the existence of overtime work is included. In 
order to economize on space, Table 3 just presents the estimated coeffi-
cients of the dummy variable for newly founded establishments (full re-
sults are available from the authors on request). It can be seen that the 
labour turnover rate in newly founded firms is higher than in incumbent 
firms only for a relatively short period of time and that start-ups assimilate 
fast: After three years in western Germany and four years in eastern 
Germany the difference in labour turnover rates between both types of 
firms is not statistically significant anymore. 
Table 3 also provides estimates of hires and departures that largely mirror 
the labour turnover results. As expected, hiring in newly founded estab-
lishments is stronger than in similar incumbent establishments, but only in 
the first two to three years. The same is true for departures: Already in 
the second year in western Germany and in the fourth year in eastern 
Germany, jobs in newly founded firms seem to be as stable as those in 
incumbent firms. These results probably reflect an initial period of new 
employment relationships, uncertainty and likely failure of newly founded 
firms that is characterized by difficult matching processes and a higher 
frequency of labour adjustment in both directions. They show that con-
cerning labour fluctuation it takes a new firm only a few years to become 
an incumbent firm. 
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Table 3: Labour fluctuation in newly founded firms over time 
(coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 2, columns 2 and 3) 
Indicator, region 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Labour turnover rate      
Western Germany 0.1583** 
(3.26) 
0.1341** 
(2.64) 
0.0123 
(0.23) 
0.0432 
(0.68) 
0.0232 
(0.32) 
Eastern Germany 0.1725** 
(6.93) 
0.1749** 
(5.93) 
0.1339** 
(4.33) 
0.0566 
(1.41) 
0.0699 
(1.43) 
Hiring rate      
Western Germany 0.1659** 
(3.22) 
0.1675** 
(2.99) 
0.0304 
(0.57) 
0.0357 
(0.55) 
0.1010 
(1.17) 
Eastern Germany 0.1766** 
(5.19) 
0.1763** 
(6.37) 
0.1274** 
(3.32) 
0.0801 
(1.82) 
0.0613 
(1.08) 
Departure rate      
Western Germany 0.1507* 
(2.33) 
0.1008 
(1.48) 
-0.0058 
(-0.09) 
0.0507 
(0.64) 
-0.0546 
(-0.81) 
Eastern Germany 0.1685** 
(4.97) 
0.1736** 
(3.74) 
0.1405** 
(3.47) 
0.0330 
(0.53) 
0.0786 
(1.21) 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively; see text for exact definitions of dependent variables. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
4 Bargaining coverage and wage setting 
In Germany, wages and working conditions are predominantly determined 
by collective bargaining between trade unions and employers associations 
or single employers at sectoral or firm level, respectively. Since the pow-
erful German trade unions have been able to push through wages that are 
relatively generous in international comparison and since negotiated work-
ing conditions (such as working hours, annual leave or fringe benefits) are 
usually much better than stipulated by law, establishments and employees 
covered by collective bargaining can be assumed to have high-quality 
jobs. Although less than 50 percent of establishments in western Germany 
and just about 25 percent of establishments in eastern Germany are cov-
ered by collective agreements, these agreements determine wages and 
working conditions of about 70 percent of employees in western and 45 
percent of employees in eastern Germany: In addition, quite a few firms 
that are not officially bound by collective agreements use these as a point 
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of reference in setting wages and working conditions (see Kohaut and 
Schnabel 2003). 
Table 4:  Bargaining coverage of newly founded firms 
(share of firms covered by a collective agreement, in percent) 
Western  
Germany 
1997 1999 2001 
Establishment 
size interval  
(employees) 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
1 to 4 37 46 34 31 40 40 
5 to 9 39 64 47 50 60 58 
10 to 19 54 70 27 57 42 51 
20 to 199 --- 76 --- 73 --- 67 
Average 39 59 38 46 46 51 
 
Eastern 
Germany 
1997 1999 2001 
Establishment 
size interval 
(employees) 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
Newly 
founded 
firms 
Incumbent 
firms 
1 to 4 27 32 13 18 25 21 
5 to 9 39 41 28 27 21 29 
10 to 19 34 50 32 45 18 38 
20 to 199 62 66 52 53 38 53 
Average 31 41 19 30 24 30 
NOTE: weighted data (cross-section weights); --- indicates that data may not be published due to an 
insufficient number of observations. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
Making use of representative data from the IAB Establishment panel and 
concentrating on our restricted sample of establishments with less than 
200 employees, Table 4 compares the bargaining coverage of newly 
founded establishments with that of incumbent establishments in several 
size intervals. It can be seen that in 1997 only 39 percent of newly 
founded firms in western Germany were covered by a collective agree-
ment whereas among incumbent firms the bargaining coverage rate was 
59 percent. This overall difference of 20 percentage points is statistically 
significant, and similar differences show up in each size interval. In east-
ern Germany, where the bargaining coverage is generally lower, newly 
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founded firms are also significantly less likely to be covered by a collective 
agreement than incumbent ones. 
Over time, there is a certain convergence between both types of firms, 
which is partly due to the falling coverage rates of incumbent firms reflect-
ing the gradual erosion of the German system of industry-wide wage bar-
gaining. Even in 2001, however, the bargaining coverage rate of newly 
founded establishments was significantly lower than that of incumbents in 
western and eastern Germany. This result is consistent with econometric 
evidence from Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) showing that young estab-
lishments (i.e. those founded in the last five years) are less likely to be 
bound by collective agreements. 
While coverage by a collective agreement does give a good general im-
pression on the quality of wages and working conditions in a plant, a more 
precise indicator is the level of wages. Newly founded firms are usually 
equated with small firms, and for these we know that they tend to pay 
lower wages, ceteris paribus (standard references include Brown et al. 
1990 and Oi and Idson 1999; for Germany, see Schmidt 1995 and Wagner 
1997). It is an open question, however, whether newly founded firms pay 
higher or lower wages than incumbent firms of the same size.11 
There are several reasons why wages in newly founded firms may differ 
from those in incumbent firms (for more general discussions see Brown 
and Medoff 2003 and Brixy et al. 2004). On the one hand, newly founded 
firms may have to pay higher wages than incumbent ones in order to at-
tract employees from the external labour market. If potential employees 
take into consideration that newly founded firms are much more likely to 
expire than older ones and have a higher labour turnover, they can be ex-
pected to demand higher wages than those that they receive from their 
current employers (or are offered by other firms) in the sense of a wage 
differential compensating for the increased risk of a job loss. Wage de-
                                                
11  There is an emerging literature that tries to find out whether the age of a firm has an 
influence on the wages paid to its employees and that provides some information on 
the wage differential of young firms (see, e.g., Audretsch et al. 2001 for the Nether-
lands, Brown and Medoff 2003 for the US and Kölling et al. 2002 for Germany). How-
ever, these studies do not pay special attention to newly founded firms and do not fol-
low an age cohort of firms over time. 
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mands will also be higher if potential employees recognize that newly 
founded firms offer fewer fringe benefits (such as pension plans) than 
long-established firms. With a falling risk of failure (and an increase in 
fringe benefits) over time, the size of this compensating wage differential 
can be expected to fall. 
On the other hand, wages in newly founded firms may be lower than in 
incumbent firms because of their lower ability to pay. In the start-up 
phase of a business it is essential for survival to keep labour costs as low 
as possible, and any claim of inability to pay higher wages is much more 
credible (and more likely to be accepted by the employees) when made by 
a newly founded firm than by a long-surviving firm. Furthermore, newly 
founded firms do not have to pay the wage premiums for tenure and firm-
specific knowledge which employees in incumbent firms command.12 Over 
time, this negative wage differential should become smaller since a firm’s 
ability to pay can be expected to rise and since its employees acquire ten-
ure and valuable firm-specific human capital. 
These contrasting theoretical hypotheses suggest that an empirical inves-
tigation may be worthwhile. As in the analyses of labour fluctuation we 
estimate OLS regressions for the period 1997 to 2001, making use of 
stacked cross section models for each year as well as pooling the data. 
The dependent variable is the log of daily wages per (full-time equivalent) 
employee at establishment level. It is calculated by dividing the annual 
sum of all wages and salaries in an establishment by the sum of (calen-
dar) days worked by all employees in this establishment. Since the num-
ber of days with part-time work is divided by 0.5, we in fact calculate a 
sort of “full-time equivalents” of employment. Because of part-time work 
and fluctuations in employment our denominator is more precise than just 
using the number of employees at some point in time. The data stem from 
                                                
12  In this case, the new firm may not be able to poach employees from other firms but 
may rely more on attracting workers who are currently unemployed, who are out of 
the labour force or who search for their first job. There may also exist non-monetary 
incentives that help newly founded firms to hire employees in spite of lower wages. 
These include enthusiasm for the business idea and the attractiveness of a situation 
with flat hierarchies where structures can still be formed. Some employees could also 
speculate that they are first in line and therefore in a good position for a career within 
the firm. Others may prefer to stay in the region where they finished their education 
and/or where they are well integrated in networks of friends and family. 
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the “German Employment Statistics” and include all wages and salaries 
paid to each employee during a job up to the contribution assessment ceil-
ing of the social security system. Since higher earnings are censored at 
this ceiling, wages in firms of high-income sectors are underreported. Al-
though there is a certain downward bias in our wage variable, this should 
not systematically and seriously affect our results on the wage differen-
tial.13 
Again our main explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable in-
dicating whether an establishment hired its first employee between 1 July, 
1995, and 30 June, 1996. The control variables are quite similar to those 
in the labour turnover regressions above. They include the number of em-
ployees in the establishment and its square (which are expected to exhibit 
the well-known positive but decreasing establishment size effect on 
wages) as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment 
is a branch plant or subsidiary (thus probably paying higher wages than 
similar independent firms). The structure of the workforce is represented 
by the employment shares of female and low-skilled employees (both of 
which are expected to receive lower wages), of high-skilled employees 
(with higher wages), and of fixed-term and part-time employees. Although 
there is no such thing as a unionized establishment in Germany, it is nec-
essary to control for the existence of sectoral or firm-level collective bar-
gaining agreements, both of which are expected to raise wages. The abil-
ity to pay of an establishment is expressed by a dummy variable reflecting 
its profit situation. We also take into account the state of production tech-
nology in the establishment, which should be positively correlated with 
wages, as well as the regional unemployment rate, which can be expected 
to reduce wages. Additional explanatory variables are the export share of 
an establishment, which should be associated with rising wages, the exis-
                                                
13  This contribution assessment ceiling is relatively high, amounting to 148 € in western 
and 124 € in eastern Germany per calendar-day in 2001. As the wage variable used is 
calculated at the establishment level whereas the contribution assessment ceiling re-
fers to the individual level, there is no clear-cut truncation point which could be taken 
into account by choosing appropriate estimation methods (such as Tobit or truncated 
regression). At the other end of the spectrum, there was a small number of wages re-
ported that were obviously too low and that probably reflected errors in the data base. 
We therefore omitted all incomes that were lower than twice the wages paid for so-
called “mini jobs” (for which only flat-rate taxes are paid). This lower threshold was 
21.18 € per day in 2001 in both parts of Germany. 
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tence of wage subsidies and the legal form of the firm, although we have 
no clear-cut priors on the likely influence of the latter variables on the 
wages paid. We also include ten industry dummies and three dummies for 
the degree of urbanization at the location of the establishment. Since 
wages in western Germany are still substantially higher than in post-
communist eastern Germany and since both labour markets still differ 
considerably, we provide disaggregated estimates for western and eastern 
Germany. 
The results of the pooled estimations for the period 1997 to 2001 (which 
also include dummies for each year) are presented in Table 2. For western 
and eastern Germany alike, the goodness of fit of the regressions is rela-
tively high and almost all coefficients estimated are significant and of the 
expected sign. The principal result is of course the negative effect of the 
newly founded establishment dummy on log wages. Over the entire pe-
riod, wages paid in newly founded establishments in western Germany 
were 8.6 percent lower than in other firms, whereas in eastern Germany 
this average wage differential was just 5.5 percent.14 This difference 
probably reflects the fact that wages in eastern Germany are generally 
about 20 percent lower, ceteris paribus, and that new firms thus may have 
less scope for paying even lower wages there. 
Table 5: Wage differentials of newly founded firms over time 
(coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 2, columns 4 and 5) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Western Germany -0.0988** 
(-3.52) 
-0.0891** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0864* 
(-2.04) 
-0.0576 
(-1.21) 
-0.0452 
(-0.98) 
Eastern Germany -0.0591** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0472** 
(-2.54) 
-0.0595** 
(-3.09) 
-0.0726** 
(-3.50) 
-0.0390 
(-1.52) 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
In addition to the average effects over the whole period shown in Table 2, 
Table 5 presents the results of cross section estimations for each single 
                                                
14  The percentage wage effect is calculated from the estimated coefficient β as 
(eβ−1)⋅100. 
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year. The models estimated are almost identical to those shown in Ta-
ble 2,15 and by and large they are equally well determined. In order to 
economize on space, Table 5 just presents the estimated coefficients of 
the dummy variable for newly founded firms (full results are available 
from the authors on request). It can be seen that the point estimates of 
the wage differential tend to fall and lose significance over time: While in 
1997 wages were 9.4 percent lower in newly founded western German 
establishments than in other plants, ceteris paribus, in 2001 the point es-
timate of the wage differential between these two groups of plants was 
just 4.4 percent. In eastern Germany, the wage differential fell from 5.7 
percent in 1997 to 3.8 percent in 2001.16 Moreover, the wage differential 
between newly founded and incumbent establishments becomes statisti-
cally insignificant after four years in western Germany whereas in eastern 
Germany this process takes five years. 
5 Concluding remarks 
The question whether job quality differs between newly founded and in-
cumbent firms of the same size and whether such differences vanish over 
time once the new businesses mature has received surprisingly little at-
tention so far. We provide a first empirical analysis that tackles these is-
sues following a cohort of newly founded and other establishments with 
less than 200 employees in western and eastern Germany from 1997 to 
2001. Our results indicate that start-ups are characterized by higher la-
bour fluctuation, lower bargaining coverage and lower wages than incum-
bent establishments. These differences are shown to decline and become 
insignificant over time as the newly founded firms mature. This result im-
plies that – at least concerning our indicators of employment quality – it 
takes a new firm only a few years to become an incumbent firm. 
                                                
15  As before, the only differences are that the year dummies are not included, of course, 
and that for all years except 1999 (where information is lacking) a dummy variable on 
the existence of overtime work is included which always proves to be significant. 
16  Since these estimates might be biased in various ways due to the failure (or non-
reporting) of newly founded and other firms in the panel, we made several checks us-
ing the full sample of all firms on which data were available (see Brixy et al. 2004 for 
details). We found that the wages paid in surviving firms do not differ significantly 
from those in other firms, thus confirming the result of Audretsch et al. (2001: 818) 
that “differentials in employee compensation are far more attributable to firm size 
than to whether the firm ultimately survives or fails.” 
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In order to establish the stability and generality of our results, the analy-
ses should be replicated with cohorts for other years and with data for 
other countries. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know more about 
the reasons for the initially higher labour turnover and the negative wage 
differential found, but these are difficult to identify and disentangle. One 
reason could be that newly founded firms rely more on workers that are 
recruited from the pool of unemployed or from out of the labour force; 
these may be less expensive but also less likely to survive the crucial ini-
tial period of a new employment relationship. Unfortunately we are not 
able to analyze this possibility since we do not have reliable information 
yet on the origin of employees in an establishment. 
Like this, some of our other questions could be answered more precisely 
by tracing the employment of individuals in various (newly founded and 
incumbent) establishments over the years. For instance, by investigating 
how the wage of a given employee changes when he or she moves from 
an incumbent to a newly founded establishment we may be able to iden-
tify the wage differential more precisely. It would also be interesting to 
see how often employees in newly founded firms experience job losses 
and how their wages evolve over time compared to that of similar em-
ployees that did not choose to work in a start-up. These issues point to 
promising areas for further research that we intend to investigate in the 
future. 
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